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Abstract. Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) systems are vulnera-
ble to relay attacks (i.e., mafia, terrorist and distance frauds) when they
are used for authentication purposes. Distance bounding protocols are
particularly designed as a countermeasure against these attacks. These
protocols aim to ensure that the tags are in a distant area by measur-
ing the round-trip delays during a rapid challenge-response exchange of
short authenticated messages. Terrorist fraud is the most challenging
attack to avoid, because a legitimate user (a tag owner) collaborates
with an attacker to defeat the authentication system. Many RFID dis-
tance bounding protocols have been proposed recently, with encouraging
results. However, none of them provides the ideal security against the
terrorist fraud.
Motivated by this need, we first introduce a strong adversary model for
Physically Unclonable Functions (PUFs) based authentication protocol
in which the adversary has access to volatile memory of the tag. We show
that the security of Sadeghi et al.’s PUF based authentication protocol
is not secure in this model. We provide a new technique to improve the
security of their protocol. Namely, in our scheme, even if an adversary has
access to volatile memory she cannot obtain all long term keys to clone
the tag. Next, we propose a novel RFID distance bounding protocol based
on PUFs which satisfies the expected security requirements. Comparing
to the previous protocols, the use of PUFs in our protocol enhances the
system in terms of security, privacy and tag computational overhead.
We also prove that our extended protocol with a final signature provides
the ideal security against all those frauds, remarkably the terrorist fraud.
Besides that, our protocols enjoy the attractive properties of PUFs, which
provide the most cost efficient and reliable means to fingerprint chips
based on their physical properties.
Keywords: RFID, Distance Bounding Protocol, PUF, Security, Terror-
ist fraud.
1 Introduction
Radio Frequency IDentification (RFID) is a technology that has been widely
used in daily life, such as in access control, in electronic passports, public
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transportation, payment and ticketing. The reader communicates with the RFID
tags using a wireless channel where the security and privacy requirements are
satisfied via cryptographic building blocks (e.g, hash functions, symmetric en-
cryptions and secure authentication protocols). However, such cryptographic
mechanisms are not sufficient to enforce strong authentication in RFID systems.
The seminal works of Desmedt et al. [8] and Beth et al. [3] on mafia and terrorist
frauds demonstrated how an adversary can defeat such protocols by simply re-
laying the messages without dealing with cryptography. The chess grandmaster
attack, which is introduced by Conway [7] in 1976, can be given as an illustration
of the problem. In this problem, an unskilled player challenges two different chess
grandmasters simultaneously. By only relaying the moves of the grandmasters
the player finally either defeats one of the grandmasters or draws against both.
Those kinds of attacks have been practically demonstrated in many different
contexts and especially in RFID systems [13, 15–17, 22]. Nowadays, RFID and
contactless smart card producers take relay attacks into account in the design
of secure commercial products [26].
Mafia fraud is a kind of relay attack where an adversary is willing to be
authenticated as if she is a legitimate prover. In order to perform this attack,
the adversary relays the messages between a prover (e.g., a tag) and a verifier
(e.g., a reader). Terrorist fraud is similar to mafia fraud except that the legitimate
tag collaborates with an adversary to be able to authenticate her. However, the
prover does not reveal his long-term private key to the adversary [6]. Finally,
distance fraud is also similar to relay attacks where a fraudulent prover tries to
persuade the verifier that she is within a certain authentication area whereas she
is not.
In order to mitigate these frauds, two main countermeasures have been adopted.
The first one is based on measuring the radio signal strength (RSS) so that the
verifier can learn whether the prover is close to it. This method has a drawback
that a capable adversary can regulate its signal strength to convince the verifier
that it is close to the verifier [14]. The second one is measuring the round trip
time of exchanged messages between the reader and the tag[8]. At Eurocrypt’93,
Brands and Chaum [5] proposed the first distance-bounding protocol to prevent
mafia fraud and distance fraud while leaving the terrorist fraud attack as an open
issue. Then, several such protocols, which use the round trip time method, have
been proposed to improve security levels against distance, mafia and terrorist
attacks [2, 14, 20, 23, 25, 28, 30, 32, 33, 36]. However, one of the main obstacles of
the existing distance bounding protocols is achieving the ideal security level (i.e.,
(1/2)n where n is a security parameter) against terrorist fraud. Some attempts
to thwart terrorist fraud [33] yield a more serious security problem namely, the
key recovery attack. This attack occurs due to the misuse of long-term key in
the protocol [20].
Our Contributions. In this paper, we first analyze the security of Sadeghi et
al.’s PUF based RFID authentication protocol [29] by our stronger adversarial
model in which an adversary has access to the volatile memory of the tag. We
show that their protocol is not secure in this model and we propose a new
technique to avoid this attack even if the adversary has the ability to access
volatile memory.
Next, we apply this technique to propose a new PUF based RFID distance
bounding protocol. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper that
introduces a PUF based RFID distance bounding protocol. It is well-known that
obtaining the long-term key of a tag is crucial in order to successfully perform the
terrorist and the distance frauds. One of the main problems of existing distance
bounding protocols is storing the long-term key into its memory which can be
obtained by a fraudulent prover. Our protocol has the advantage that the long-
term key will not be stored in the memory of the tag but will be reconstructed
by using a PUF circuit.
Our first PUF based distance bounding protocol is based on the well-known
Hancke and Kuhn’s scheme [14] which is the starting point of this work. Although
their original protocol is known to be simple and efficient, the adversary’s prob-
ability of success is high (namely (3/4)n for both the distance and the mafia
frauds, and 1 for the terrorist fraud). By the use of PUF, the adversarial capa-
bilities of the terrorist fraud is reduced to that of the mafia fraud. In this way,
we improve the security of Hancke-Kuhn’s protocol against the terrorist fraud
from 1 to (3/4)n.
We also propose our second distance bounding protocol which is an exten-
sion of the first one involving a hash-based final signature. To the best of our
knowledge, this is the first protocol that achieves the ideal security levels (1/2)n
against all frauds.
Outline of the paper. The organization of the paper is as follows: In Section 2,
we briefly describe some existing distance bounding protocols. In Section 3, we
illustrate the notion of PUF functions and its characteristics. Section 4 describes
the adversary capabilities for both PUFs and distance bounding protocols. In
Section 5, we propose our first distance bounding protocol and analyze its se-
curity. In Section 6, we present our second protocol and analyze its security.
Section 7 concludes the paper.
2 Distance Bounding Protocols
Distance bounding approach was a breakthrough to thwart relay attacks by
measuring the round trip time of short authenticated messages. Brands and
Chaum introduced the first distance bounding protocol[5]. This protocol aims
to bring a solution to mafia and distance frauds. It consists of three phases, a
slow phase, followed by a fast phase and a final signature phase. The first slow
phase is used to exchange the committed random bits. The proximity verification
is achieved by a bitwise challenge-response during the second phase (i.e., fast
phase), namely after series of n rounds where n is a security parameter. For
each round of the fast phase, the verifier measures the round-trip time in order
to extract the propagation time. Finally, the prover sends a final signature to
the verifier and opens the commitments to complete the protocol. The success
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probability of mafia and distance frauds for this protocol are (1/2)n, but it is
not secure against terrorist fraud.
Cˇapkun et al. modified the Brands and Chaum’s protocol to achieve mutual
authentication with distance-bounding [36]. However, their protocol is also vul-
nerable to terrorist fraud and is not resilient to bit errors during the rapid bit
exchange.
Hancke and Kuhn proposed the first use of distance bounding protocol for
RFID systems [14]. The major difference from Brands and Chaum’s protocol is
that it does not involve a final signature phase. This protocol involves a common
secret symmetric-key k between a prover and a verifier. This protocol can be
briefly described as follows. The verifier first generates a nonce Nv and sends
it to the prover. Similarly, the prover also generates a nonce Np and sends it
to the verifier. Two n-bit registers R1, R2 are computed such that R1‖R2 =
f(k,Nv, Np) where f is a public pseudorandom function. After that, n-round
fast phase starts. For each i-th round, the verifier picks a random challenge-bit
ci and sends it to the prover. The prover replies with a response-bit ri such that
ri =
{
R0i ifci = 0
R1i ifci = 1
}
.
The success probabilities against the mafia fraud and distance fraud are both
equal to (3/4)n [14, 19].
Distance bounding protocols are classified into two classes depending on
whether a final signature is involved (e.g., [2, 19, 20, 23, 25, 32, 33]). These
papers mostly focused on improving the security against mafia and distance
frauds, and in fact some of them achieved the ideal security level (1/2)n against
only both frauds. Furthermore, some others achieve (3/4)n as the best security
level for terrorist fraud. Unfortunately, none of these protocols achieve the ideal
security against terrorist fraud.
Avoine et al. [1] introduced a unified framework for improving the analysis
and the design of distance bounding protocols. The black-box and the white-
box security models are introduced in the distance bounding domain, and the
relation between the frauds are described with respect to these models. In the
white-box model, the prover can provide more information to the adversary since
the can access the internal key. We note that all the protocols in the literature
are analyzed in the white-box model and therefore, the security level is worse
than that can be achievable in the black-box model.
In the next section, PUFs will be described which will be later used in our
protocols. We later show that the use of PUFs eliminates our protocols to be
analyzed in the white-box model.
3 Physically Unclonable Functions (PUFs)
Physically Unclonable Functions (PUFs) were invented by Naccache and Fre-
manteau in 1992 [24]. A PUF is defined as an unclonable function that maps
challenges to responses. The response r is calculated as a result of physical prop-
erties such as delays of gates and wires in a circuit, variations in the temperature
and supply voltage. The unclonability of the function is guaranteed as a result of
these physical processes. An ordinary PUF circuit may produce slightly different
outputs to the same inputs. Using mechanisms like Fuzzy Extractors [10, 37],
one can guarantee that PUF circuit produces the same response to the same
challenge. For further information about other types of PUFs we refer to [31].
Since PUFs behave as a random function, it is hard to predict the inputs as
given the outputs. Therefore, they can also be considered as one-way functions.
In addition, a PUF circuit can easily be implemented into a small area with
less than 1000 gates [34]. Besides that, their intrinsic structure yields resistance
against tampering. When the adversary tries to evaluate a PUF or an IC, for
instance, by using the probes to measure the wire delays, the characteristics of
that particular PUF will be changed. Thus, this physical attack will not give any
advantage to the adversary [21]. These features make PUF an attractive tool for
authentication mechanisms in RFID systems.
In [27] the use of PUFs in RFID systems is proposed. The idea is to use a
set of predetermined set of challenge-response pairs with the help of a database.
The readers use the database to identify the tag. In this protocol, the possible
challenge-response pairs are restricted with the database. A challenge also cannot
be used for the second time, since it results to replay attacks. The proposed
scheme has been implemented and analyzed in [9].
In [34], PUF is used as a secure key derivation mechanism. Instead of putting
the key in memory, it is derived from the circuit each time whenever it is required.
This property of PUFs mitigates the hardware-based cloning attacks. A practical
illustration is RFID tags, which can easily be cloned. When equipped with a
PUF, creating a clone in a reasonable time is impractical. Furthermore, the
concept of SRAM-PUFs is proposed in [18]. They propose that SRAM memory
cells can be used as a PUF mechanism which are readily available in the existing
RFID chips.
A simple privacy preserving identification system is proposed in [4]. This
protocol uses a PUF P for frequently updating the identity of tags where the
reader stores the vector (ID, P (ID), P 2(ID), . . . , P k(ID)). To authenticate to
a reader, a tag first sends its current ID and updates it using the PUF P (ID).
The reader searches the current identifier of the tag from the database. If the
reader finds a tuple, it authenticates the tag and removes all the elements which
have been used before in the authentication mechanism. Note that this protocol
suffers from the Denial of Service Attacks since the tag must be re-initialized
after at most k sessions.
Sadeghi et al. [29] suggested to deploy PUF (in a similar way as described by
Tuyls and Batina in [34]) in order to develop a privacy-preserving tag authenti-
cation protocol for RFID systems. This protocol provides destructive privacy in
the Vaudenay’s formal framework [35].
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In this paper, we will focus on an ideal PUF P such that P : {0, 1} → {0, 1}m
where the challenge ci is mapped to the response ri. P is said to be an ideal PUF
if the following properties are satisfied.
1. If ci = cj , then we have ri = rj for a PUF on a particular device. Presenting
the same challenge to the PUF on a different device will produce a different
response.
2. The mapping between ci and ri is unpredictable and random. For instance,
if ri and rj differ in only a single bit, knowledge of ci does not reveal usable
information to predict cj .
3. Any attempt to physically tamper with the device implementing P causes
to change its physical characteristics. Namely, P is then destructed and can
no longer be evaluated correctly.
We note that the third property of the idealized PUF can be achieved by in-
tegrating PUF circuit with the chip on the tag. To do so, Tuyls et al. in [34]
propose Integrated PUFs (I-PUFs). For further information we recommend read-
ing [29, 34]. In this work, we use the ideal PUF for distance bounding protocols
and show how the security is enhanced to ideal levels.
4 Adversary Capabilities
In this section, we first present a stronger adversarial model for analysis of PUF
based RFID authentication protocols which considers the accessibility to the
internal state of tags. We next discuss the notion of white and black box models
for distance bounding protocols. We aim to unify and express the adversarial
capabilities of PUFs and distance bounding protocols.
4.1 Adversary Capabilities for PUFs
In a PUF based authentication protocol, the shared secrets are stored in its
physical characteristics instead of storing them in a non-volatile memory. These
keys are reconstructed whenever needed during the execution of the protocol.
As soon as the keys are reconstructed, they are stored in a volatile memory
of the RFID chip. In some previous articles (e.g., [29, 34]), it is assumed that
the communication between a PUF circuit and a chip is not tractable by any
side-channel attack.
Unlike the previous works, in this paper, we propose a more stronger adversary
model where an attacker has the ability to compromise the tag and reaches the
state in the volatile memory. Since the structure of the PUF circuit has been
destroyed, the attacker is no longer able to re-evaluate the PUF again. Thus, a
malicious tag owner can perform only one side-channel attack on the tag and
access the volatile memory only once. For instance, Halderman et al. recently
demonstrated a side-channel attack for DRAM, called cold boot attack [12]. In
this attack, they first powered off the system and later showed how to extend the
main memory persistence by ’freezing’ the DRAM chips in order to maintain the
memory cell state. In this way, an adversary will be able to retrieve any password
or cryptographic key that was not disappeared before the system is switched off.
The protocol of Sadeghi et al. [29] is facing a similar attack described above.
Their protocol is briefly described as follows (Figure 1). Let l ∈ N be a security
parameter, and F:{0, 1}k×{0, 1}2α → {0, 1}β be a public pseudorandom (PRF)
function. Each tag T is equipped with a PUF function P:{0, 1}γ → {0, 1}k and
is initialized with a random state S1 ∈R {0, 1}γ. The credential of each tag
(ID,K), where K ← P (S) and is stored in the database DB of the reader. The
reader R first picks a random nonce a to the tag TID. Then, TID picks a random
nonce b and evaluates the PUF function K = P (S). TID computes c = FK(a, b)
and sends the message c along with the random nonce b and immediately erases
K, a, b and c from its volatile memory. Upon receiving of b and c, R evaluates
c′ = FK(a, b) for each tuple (ID,K) in DB until there is a match. If a matching
(ID,K) is found, then it accepts TID and returns ID; otherwise, it rejects by
sending ⊥ back.
Fig. 1. Sadeghi et al.’s authentication protocol [29]
The authors claim that their protocol achieves destructive-privacy under the
assumption that K is inaccessible. However, we show that their protocol suffers
from the same above-mentioned cold-boot attack. Assume that an adversary
sends a random nonce a to the tag TID. TID then generates another random
nonce b and reconstructs a secret K by evaluating the PUF with input S. The
secretK is stored in the volatile memory during the computation of c = FK(a, b).
The adversary compromises TID while c = FK(a, b) is computed and can capture
the secret K. Hence, the tag can be successfully cloned although the structure
of the PUF circuit has been destroyed.
In order to thwart this attack, instead of using only one key we propose to
use two different keys K,L which are consecutively generated as outputs of the
PUF function. Note that K and L never appear in the volatile memory at the
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same time. First, K is used as an input of one-way PRF function, and then
completely deleted from the memory. Next, in a similar way, L is generated and
used in the PRF function. Hence, whenever an adversary applies the above-
mentioned attack he will be able to obtain only one of the keys, and hence will
not have sufficient information to defeat the privacy. Also, since the PUF circuit
has been destroyed he will not be able to perform the same attack again. Thus,
applying our technique avoids the tag cloning.
4.2 Adversary Capabilities for Distance Bounding Protocols
In the analysis of our protocols, Dolev-Yao adversary model are considered [11].
In this model, the adversary can perform polynomial number of computations
and cannot obtain the secret keys from the honest parties. This assumption is
then relaxed with the terrorist and distance frauds, where the prover has access to
the keys [1]. However, he disagrees to share these keys with any third party. The
adversary may use one of the three strategies to query a prover such as pre-ask
strategy, post-ask strategy and early-reply strategy. The detailed explanations
of these strategies are addressed in [1].
As in the conventional distance bounding protocols, we also assume that the
verifier is an honest party where it faithfully follows the protocol specifications
without cheating. Mafia fraud is a kind of man-in-the-middle attack where an
adversary defeats both honest parties i.e., verifier and prover. Unlike mafia fraud,
in distance and terrorist frauds, the prover himself is dishonest. The previous
distance bounding protocols consider that the prover has a full control on the
execution of the algorithm in the device. As it is discussed in Section 3, PUFs
can be used to provide resistance against side-channel attacks. Therefore, an
adversary can be limited to the execution of the algorithm inside the device.
In order to analyze distance bounding protocols, the generic capabilities of the
adversary are addressed in [1]. The capabilities are categorized in two models,
white-box model and black-box model. The following definitions of these two
models are excerpted from [1].
Definition 1. (Black-box model) In this model, the prover cannot observe or
tamper with the execution of the algorithm.
Definition 2. (White-box model) In this model, the prover has full access to
the implementation of the algorithm and has a complete control over the execu-
tion environment.
Regarding to the white-box and the black-box models Figure 2 presents the
relation between the distance, mafia and terrorist frauds. An arrow from X to
Y means that, for any fraud in X that succeeds with probability pX , then there
exists an attack in Y that succeeds with probability pY such that pY ≥ pX . Two
side arrow means that the success probabilities of two corresponding frauds are
equal [1].
It is interesting to note that in the black-box model, the success probabilities
of the mafia and the terrorist frauds are equal (Figure 2).
White−box model
Terrorist fraud Terrorist fraud
Mafia fraud Mafia fraud
Distance fraudDistance fraud
Black−box model
Fig. 2. Relations between the frauds in the white-box and the black-box models [1]
5 Our First Protocol
We now propose the first PUF based distance bounding protocol which is effi-
cient for implementation in low cost devices. In the next section, we extend this
protocol by adding a final signature to enhance the security against terrorist
fraud. The former achieves the security level of (3/4)n against mafia, terrorist
and distance frauds, where n is the number challenge/response bits during the
fast phase. We show in the next section that the latter achieves the ideal security
level against all the frauds (i.e., (1/2)n).
5.1 Protocol Descriptions
Our first distance bounding protocol is based on Hancke and Kuhn’s scheme [14],
which is the starting point of this work. Although their protocol is simple and
efficient the adversary’s probability of success is high. The steps of our protocol
are summarized below and depicted in Figure 3.
Initialization. Let Pi : {0, 1}k → {0, 1} be a (unique) ideal PUF of the i-
th legitimate prover Pi. The credentials database DB of the verifier V stores a
tuple (Ki, Li) whereKi = Pi(G
1
i ) and Li = Pi(G
2
i ) for random states G
1
i , G
2
i ∈R
{0, 1}k. Let also F : {0, 1} × {0, 1}2 → {0, 1}2 be a one-way pseudorandom
function. We denote n as the main security parameter of the fast phase where
3n = 2. |S| denotes the bit-length of a bit-string S.
Our protocol consists of two phases: a slow phase and a fast phase.
Slow phase:
– First of all, V generates a random nonce rV and sends it to Pi.
– Upon receiving rV , Pi generates a random nonce rP and reconstructs Ki =
Pi(G
1
i ). Pi computes T = FKi(rP , rV ), then immediately deletes Ki from
the memory. After that, Pi reconstructs the secret key Li = Pi(G2i ) and
computes the message FLi(T ). Similarly, Pi immediately deletes Li from
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the memory. The value FLi(T ) is divided into three registers v1, v2 and v3
where |v1| = |v2| = |v3| = n. Finally, Pi sends rT and v1 to V .
– Upon receiving rT and v1, for each tuple (Ki, Li) in DB V searches v′1, v′2, v′3 =
FL(FK(rP , rV )) such that v
′
1 = v1. If not found, V aborts the protocol.
Fast phase:
– The fast phase consists of n bitwise challenge-response exchange. For each
round j ∈ {1, . . . , n}, V picks a random challenge bit cj and sends it to Pi.
– Pi immediately responds rj = vj2 if cj = 0, otherwise rj = vj3.
Verification. Whenever the fast phase is finished V verifies that the responses
from Pi are correct and checks whether tj ≤ tmax ∀ j = 1, . . . , n where
tmax is a timing bound.
5.2 Security Analysis
Mafia, terrorist, and distance frauds are the three main security concerns when
considering distance bounding protocols. The following Theorem 1 indicates that
no adversary (e.g., a malicious tag owner) can access to both secrets Ki and Li.
Thus, the use of PUF in the protocol makes the RFID tags as tamper proof
against any malicious adversary.
Theorem 1. Let Ki, Li be secrets of a tag Ti for some i in the above-mentioned
protocol (see Figure 3). Assume that there is an adversary A with a full side-
channel capability on the tag Ti. If Pi is an ideal PUF, then A can only access
either the secret Ki or the secret Li, but not both in the same tag Ti.
Proof. (sketch) The pre-keys G1i and G
2
i are feeded into the Pi function to gen-
erate the real keys Ki and Li. The real keys only appear during the execution of
the protocol. Note that Ki and Li never appear in the memory of Ti at the same
time because Ki is first used as an input of a one-way PRF function, and then
completely deleted from the memory. Next, in a similar way, Li is generated
and used in the PRF function. Whenever A applies a side channel attack to
Ti, the physical characteristics of the PUF Pi will be broken and will no longer
be evaluated correctly. If A applies side-channel attack to extract Ki then the
structure of Pi will be destroyed and Li cannot be generated. Similarly, if A
applies side-channel attack to extract Li she cannot obtain Ki since it is already
deleted. Therefore, A can access either Ki or Li but not both. Hence, A will not
be able to get the complete key of Ti.
Theorem 1 indicates that a malicious prover cannot obtain the secret keys, and
thus cannot evaluate the registers v1, v2, v3. Unlike existing distance bounding
protocols, it is not possible to apply the white-box analysis to our protocol.
Therefore, we analyze our protocol according to the black-box model. In the
black-box model, note that it is already proven that the capability of terrorist
Verifier Proveri
DB = {(K1, L1), . . . , (KN , LN )} G1i , G2i
Slow phase
Pick rV ∈R {0, 1}l Pick rP ∈R {0, 1}l
rV−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ Ki = Pi(G1i )
T = FKi(rP , rV )
delete Ki
Li = Pi(G
2
i )
v1, v2, v3 = FLi(T )
|v1| = |v2| = |v3| = n
delete Li
If ∃(K,L) ∈ DB rP ,v1←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
s.t. v′1, v
′
2, v
′
3 = FL(FK(rP , rV ))
and v′1 = v1 then
goto Fast phase
else return ⊥
endif
Fast phase
for j = 1, . . . , n:
cj ∈R {0, 1}
Start timer
cj−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
if cj = 0 then
rj = v
j
2
else rj = v
j
3
endif
Stop timer
rj←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
Fig. 3. Our first PUF based distance bounding protocol without a final signature
fraud is equivalent to the mafia fraud [1] (see also Figure 2). Hence, we combine
the security analysis of both mafia and terrorist frauds.
Note that a malicious prover can access the registers v1, v2, v3 by applying
side-channel attack only once. Furthermore, he can complete only the current
session successfully because of the destruction of PUF. However, since the reg-
isters v1, v2, v3 are randomized this does not give any future advantage to the
adversary.
For a distance bounding protocol, an adversary is able to use three different
strategies to conduct her attack such that early-reply, pre-ask, and post-ask [1].
We denote by A a malicious adversary. Let also denote by MF , TF and DF
the mafia fraud, the terrorist fraud and the distance fraud, respectively. Let F
be a fraud and S be the strategy used by the adversary A. Let PrF |S be the
success probability in the black-box model of the fraud F (MF/DF/TF ) using
the strategy S (early/pre/post). Note that the strategies can also be combined
and this is denoted by an &. Next, we describe the success probability of each
fraud as follows.
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Mafia and terrorist fraud analysis. The adversary uses pre-ask or post-ask
strategies in order to achieve mafia or terrorist fraud.
Pre-ask strategy [1]. In this strategy, A first relays the slow phase between V and
P . Then A executes the fast phase with P . A sends predicted challenges c′j to P
and get the responses r′j corresponding to her challenges. With this a strategy,
A obtains only one of the register. Afterward, A executes the fast phase with V
and receives the challenges cjs. There are two equal likely cases, (i) if cj = c
′
j
A sends the correct response with probability of 1; otherwise, (ii) A guess the
response with probability of 1/2. Hence, the success probability of mafia fraud
and terrorist fraud for n-round fast phase is computed as follows.
PrMF |pre = PrTF |pre =
(
1
2
· 1 + 1
2
· 1
2
)n
=
(
3
4
)n
.
Post-ask strategy [1]. In pre-ask strategy, A first relays the slow phase, then
executes the fast phase with V . The probability of sending a correct response
for a challenge is 1/2. Then, A queries P with the correct challenges received
during the fast phase to check whether she is succeed on cheating. The success
probability of mafia fraud for this strategy is:
PrMF |post = PrTF |post =
(
1
2
)n
.
To maximize the success probability the attacker chooses the best strategy.
Hence, the success probability of both mafia and terrorist frauds are (3/4)n.
Distance fraud analysis. In distance fraud, the tag owner herself is fraudulent
who tries to cheat on her proximity from V . It is important to highlight that
unlike the existing protocols, the tag owner cannot control the internal executions
of the tag in our protocol. The fraudulent prover can query its tag to get the
responses. In distance fraud, since the prover is outside of the legal authentication
region she should send the responses earlier in order to pass the proximity check
(i.e., round trip time measurement). This is called early-reply strategy [1]. To
ease our analysis, we denote the fraudulent tag owner by A, and the tag by T .
Pre-ask combined with early-reply strategy. In this strategy, A first relays the
slow phase between V and T , then executes the fast phase with T . A can only
obtain n-bit responses corresponding to her predicted challenges. Since A is not
inside the neighborhood of V , she sends her responses in advance. Two cases
occurs for each round of the fast phase. (i) A predicts V ’s challenge correctly,
then she sends a correct corresponding response in advance. (ii) A cannot not
predict V ’s challenge correctly, but she sends a correct answer with probability
of 1/2. Thus, the distance fraud success probability is:
PrDF |pre&early =
(
1
2
· 1 + 1
2
· 1
2
)n
=
(
3
4
)n
.
Post-ask combined with early-reply strategy. Similar to the mafia fraud analysis,
it is clear that using the post-ask strategy is equivalent to randomly guessing
the responses,
PrDF |post&early =
(
1
2
)n
.
The distance fraud attacker chooses the strategy with the maximum success
probability. Consequently, the success probability of distance fraud is (3/4)n.
6 Our Extended Protocol
We are now ready to propose our extended protocol which is resistant to all the
frauds.
6.1 Protocol Descriptions
In what follows, we present our second protocol which is an extension of the first
one by adding a final signature. This protocol consists of three phases. The first
two phases are exactly the same with the previous protocol. In the third phase,
the prover computes the following final signature
fsign = h(c1, . . . , cn, T, Li).
where h denotes a collusion resistant and one-way hash function. To evaluate
fsign, first prover regenerate Li once more and delete it from the memory as
soon as fsign is computed. The prover sends fsign to the verifier, then the verifier
checks the correctness of this message.
6.2 Security Analysis
In the first protocol, mafia and distance frauds can successfully pass the fast
phase with probability of (3/4)n by predicting the challenges. However, this
attack does not work in the extended protocol because the challenges received
by the tag are digested in fsign. In order to pass the authentication, the adversary
must send a valid final signature to the verifier. Similar to the first protocol, there
are two strategies for both mafia and terrorist frauds:
(i) In the pre-ask strategy, the adversary first executes the fast phase with
the prover by sending c′1, . . . , c
′
n challenges, then prover replies with the cor-
responding responses r′1, . . . , r′n. In the final phase, the adversary gets f ′sign =
h(c′1, . . . , c
′
n, T, Li). The final signature is valid if and only if all the challenges
c1, . . . , cn sent by the verifier are equal to the ones predicted by the adversary.
Thus, it is clear that the probability of fsign = f
′
sign is equal to (1/2)
n.
(ii) In the post-ask strategy, the adversary first plays with the verifier and
guesses all the responses during the fast phase. If she passes the fast phase then
it is easy to get the valid final signature from the prover by forwarding the
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challenges of the verifier. However, the probability of guessing all the correct
responses during the fast phase is equal to (1/2)n. Thus,
PrMF = PrTF =
(
1
2
)n
.
Similarly, the security of the extended protocol for distance fraud is also bounded
by (1/2)n due to the same reasons described-above. Namely, in order to receive
a valid final signature from the tag the fraudulent prover should have queried
the tag with all correct challenges in advance. Hence, the use of final signature
enhances the security level of our extended protocol against the distance fraud
to the ideal level (1/2)n.
7 Conclusion
Relay attacks are indeed practical threats for RFID systems since using only
cryptographic primitives it is not easy to thwart mafia, distance and terrorist
frauds. Distance bounding protocols are used to mitigate these threats. How-
ever, the existing distance bounding protocols cannot achieve ideal security level
against all frauds.
In this paper, we present the first PUF based distance bounding authentica-
tion protocol. Note that the protocols based on PUFs are known to be powerful
since attacks can be easily prevented and the use of expensive cryptographic
primitives can be minimized. In our protocol, we use the idea of key storage
mechanism based on PUFs for public-key cryptosystems presented by Tuyls and
Batina [34] (which is also later used for symmetric key storage by Sadeghi et
al. [29]). We modified their protocol in such a way that all the keys are not
constructed at the same time. This enables us to achieve a stronger assumption
and there is no way to extract the whole secret key from the tag. We show that
our first protocol achieves the security level of (3/4)n against mafia, terrorist
and distance frauds. We also extend our protocol by adding a final signature to
enhance the security levels. Namely, we achieve the security level (1/2)n against
for all mafia, terrorist and distance frauds. To the best our knowledge, this is
the first paper that achieves the ideal security level (1/2)n against all frauds.
An interesting further question is whether it is possible to find an efficient
protocol without a final signature having the ideal security level against all
frauds.
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